[[["易于理解","easyToUnderstand","thumb-up"],["解决了我的问题","solvedMyProblem","thumb-up"],["其他","otherUp","thumb-up"]],[["很难理解","hardToUnderstand","thumb-down"],["信息或示例代码不正确","incorrectInformationOrSampleCode","thumb-down"],["没有我需要的信息/示例","missingTheInformationSamplesINeed","thumb-down"],["翻译问题","translationIssue","thumb-down"],["其他","otherDown","thumb-down"]],["最后更新时间 (UTC)：2025-09-04。"],[],[],null,["# Encryption from the load balancer to the backends\n\nEncryption in all Google Cloud regions\n--------------------------------------\n\nAll VM-to-VM traffic within a VPC network and peered\nVPC networks is encrypted.\n\nEncryption between proxy load balancers and backends\n----------------------------------------------------\n\nFor some proxy load balancers (see table 1), Google automatically encrypts\ntraffic to the backends that reside within Google Cloud VPC\nnetworks. This is called *automatic network-level encryption*.\nAutomatic network-level encryption is only applicable to communications with\nthese types of backends:\n\n- Instance groups\n- Zonal NEGs (`GCE_VM_IP_PORT` endpoints)\n\nIn addition, Google Cloud provides [secure protocol options to\nencrypt communication with the backend\nservice](/load-balancing/docs/backend-service#protocol_to_the_backends).\n\nSome Google Cloud load balancers use [Google Front Ends\n(GFEs)](/security/infrastructure/design#google_front_end_service) as the\nclient to the backends whereas others use the open source [Envoy\nproxy](https://www.envoyproxy.io/).\nIn all cases, the load balancer supports the cipher suites listed in\n[RFC 8446, section 9.1](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-9.1)\nfor TLS 1.3. For TLS 1.2 and earlier, the load balancer supports the cipher suites\nassociated with the COMPATIBLE\n[SSL policy profile](/load-balancing/docs/ssl-policies-concepts#defining_an_ssl_policy).\n\nThe following table provides a summary of the proxy load balancers that encrypt traffic to the backends.\n\n### Secure backend protocol use cases\n\nA secure protocol to connect to backend instances is recommended in the\nfollowing cases:\n\n- When you require an auditable, encrypted connection from the load balancer (or\n Cloud Service Mesh) to the backend instances.\n\n- When the load balancer connects to a backend instance that is outside of\n Google Cloud (with an [internet\n NEG](/load-balancing/docs/negs/internet-neg-concepts)). Communication\n to an internet NEG backend might transit the public internet. When the load\n balancer connects to an internet NEG, the public CA-signed certificate must\n [meet the validation\n requirements](/load-balancing/docs/negs/internet-neg-concepts#ssl_server_certification_validation_and_san_validation).\n\n### Secure backend protocol considerations\n\nWhen using a secure backend service protocol, keep the following in mind:\n\n- Your load balancer's backend instances or endpoints must serve using the same\n protocol as the backend service. For example, if the backend service protocol\n is HTTPS, the backends must be HTTPS servers.\n\n- If the backend service protocol is HTTP/2, your backends must use TLS. For\n configuration instructions, see the documentation for the software running\n on your backend instances or endpoints.\n\n- You must install private keys and certificates on your backend instances or\n endpoints in order for them to function as HTTPS or SSL servers. These\n certificates don't need to match the load balancer's frontend SSL\n certificates. For installation instructions, see the documentation for the\n software running on your backend instances or endpoints.\n\n- With the exception of HTTPS load balancers with [internet NEG\n backends](/load-balancing/docs/negs/internet-neg-concepts), load balancers\n don't use the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension for connections to the\n backend.\n\n- When a load balancer connects to backends that are within Google Cloud,\n the load balancer accepts any certificate your backends present. In this case,\n the load balancer performs only minimum certificate validation.\n\n For example, certificates are treated as valid even in the following\n circumstances:\n - The certificate is self-signed.\n - The certificate is signed by an unknown certificate authority (CA).\n - The certificate has expired or is not yet valid.\n - The `CN` and `subjectAlternativeName` attributes don't match a `Host` header or DNS PTR record.\n\n For RSA certificates, starting April 28, 2025, the load balancer will only\n accept RSA certificates that have the X509v3 Key Usage extension present and\n include both the Digital Signature and Key Encipherment parameters. For more\n information, see the associated [release note on January 24,\n 2025](/load-balancing/docs/release-notes#January_24_2025).\n\nSecure frontend protocols\n-------------------------\n\nWhen you use a target HTTPS or target SSL proxy as part of your configuration,\nGoogle Cloud uses a secure frontend protocol.\n\nExternal Application Load Balancers and external proxy Network Load Balancers use Google's\nBoringCrypto library. For FIPS 140-2 details, see [NIST Cryptographic Module\nValidation Program Certificate #3678](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/certificate/3678).\n\nInternal Application Load Balancers use Google's BoringSSL library. For FIPS 140-2\ndetails, see the [Envoy documentation](https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/intro/arch_overview/security/ssl).\nGoogle builds Envoy proxies for internal Application Load Balancers in FIPS compliant\nmode.\nCloud Service Mesh supports Envoy proxies that are built in FIPS-compliant mode."]]
